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social rights. Judges have the power to strike down any act of
government that affects constitutional rights. Since policies advanced
by the IFIs may have an impact on social rights, these policies could
be subject to judicial review.
In this article, I will first describe the status of social rights in
Argentina's constitution. I will then turn to the possible
contradictions between these rights and IFI-sponsored policies.
Finally, I will describe what the judiciary is entitled to do about these
contradictions under Argentina's constitutional design.
I. SOCIAL RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA'S
CONSTITUTION
In the wake of a decade-long neoliberal experiment, Argentina
found itself in an unprecedented social crisis.' In 2002, more than a
half of Argentineans lived in poverty and one out of four was
indigent. Three million people remained unemployed, while half a
million children under 14 worked in the worst conditions. A third of
senior citizens had no income of their own. Eighteen million people
lacked medical insurance.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE ON SOCIAL RIGHTS
The original 1853 Argentinean Constitution did not include social
rights.' In 1949, a far-reaching reform incorporated several social
1. See DEFENSOR DEL PUEBLO DE LA NACION-OMBUDSMAN NACIONAL
[PEOPLE'S DEFENDER], 2002 NOVENO INFORME ANUAL [2002 NINTH ANNUAL
REPORT] 4-7, 154-55 (2002) abridged version available at
http://www.defensor.gov.ar/informes/ianual2002.pdf (attributing the cause of
turmoil to government inaction during economic and social crisis in Argentina);
see also Dia Clave Para Financiar El Plan Nacional, LA NACION, Dec. 10, 2002,
at 18, available at
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/herramientas/printfriendly/printfriendly.asp?notaid-4
57371 (announcing the passage of emergency legislation to provide food not only
for children but also for pregnant woman, disabled people with mental or physical
conditions, and people older than seventy years as evidence of the severity of the
economic crisis.
2. See ARG. CONST. (1853). The 1853 Constitution, however, included a
provision that today might be classified as a social right. Article 5 established
tuition-free elementary education as a duty of provincial governments. Yet a
constitutional reform in 1860 eliminated the reference to tuitions. See ARG. CONST.
(1957). See also Elina S. Mecle Armifiana, Los Derechos Sociales en la
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rights under Peronist rule, but a subsequent military government
restored the original text a few years later.' In 1957, a modest reform
included a set of social rights, usually regarded as non-self-
executing.4
In 1994, a broad constitutional reform included a wider range of
social rights through two mechanisms.' First, the reform added some
social rights and guarantees. Second, it endowed a group of human
rights international treaties with constitutional rank.
Through the first method, the Constitutional Convention added
some social rights, such as consumers' rights,6 and the right to a
healthy environment.7 Other guarantees, for instance, included
instructions to Congress in order to preserve tuition-free public
education.'
In the most interesting development, the Convention endowed
nine human rights treaties with constitutional rank.9 The treaties are
to be harmonized with the rest of the Constitution, as parts of a single
document. Therefore, Argentina grants some human right treaties
Constituci6n Argentina y su Vinculaci6n con la Politica y las Politicas Sociales, in
POBREZA, DESIGUALDAD SOCIAL Y CIUDADANIA: Los LIMITES DE LAS POLITICAS
SOCIALES EN AMERICA LATINA 37 (Alicia Ziccardi ed., 2001) (compiled by
CLACSO (Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales [Latin American
Council on Social Sciences]) (noting that the 1853 Constitution does not explicitly
include social rights and the effect this has had on Argentinean society).
3. See Susana N. Vittadini Andres, First Amendment Influence in Argentine
Republic Law and Jurisprudence, 4 COMM. L. & POL'Y 149, 161 (1999)
(describing the 1955 military government's abolition of the 1949 reforms).
4. See ARG. CONST. (1957) art. 14 bis (granting the workers' right to
"protection against arbitrary dismissal," "equal pay for equal work," "participation
in the profits of enterprises, with control of production and collaboration in the
management," the unions' right to strike, and every citizen's fight to social security
benefits and the right to family protection, among others).
5. See, e.g., ARG. CONST. (1994) arts. 41, 42, 75 (providing increased social
rights to citizens such as consumer rights, health and environment rights, education
rights, and incorporating internationally recognized human rights).
6. Id. art. 42.
7. Id. art. 41.
8. Id. art. 75, § 19.
9. Id. art. 75, § 22. The same provision includes a Congressional procedure
for the removal of these treaties from the constitutional framework, and for the
incorporation of new human rights treaties. Both operations require supermajority
votes in both houses of Congress. Id.
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constitutional standing, 0 apart from Argentina's commitment at the
international level. "
The incorporated treaties include several provisions on social
rights. The most relevant treaty, of course, is the 1966 International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"). 2
However, other social rights come from other incorporated treaties,
such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"), the Convention on the
Rights of the Child ("CRC"), and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights ("UDHR"). 3
Argentinean legal culture is still starting to assess the whole
impact of this reform. The crucial task of interpreting these rights is
still starting, 4  and the judiciary seems to be undertaking
contradictory steps.' 5 In general, social rights have not been
developed or studied to the same extent as civil and political rights. 6
10. See Janet Koven Levit, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in
Argentina: Problem or Promise?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281, 292-301
(1999) (describing Argentina's unique strategy of incorporating "verbatim replica"
of human rights treaties into its Constitution, and contrasting it with other South
American countries' incorporation of the "spirit" or "textures and nuances" of
those treaties).
11. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights:
Harmony and Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1873-80 (2003) (explaining
how the dual protection of fundamental rights by an international human rights
regime and a national constitutional regime creates the possibility of dissonance
due to divergent or conflicting interpretations of those rights).
12. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights arts. 6-14,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3, 6-9 [hereinafter ICESCR].
13. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women arts. 10-14, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 17-20 [hereinafter
CEDAW]; Convention on the Rights of the Child arts. 23-29, 32, Nov. 20, 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 43, 51-55 [hereinafter CRC]; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights arts. 22-26, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
14. See Levit, supra note 10, at 313, 327 (asserting that the internalization
strategy has not yet produced results, largely due to the courts' passivity when
interpreting and analyzing the incorporated rights).
15. See id. at 325-27 (discussing the Argentinean Supreme Court's
manipulation of Article 75(22) by noting how the court "twisted international law
against individual petitioners, hindering rather than helping compliance efforts" in
one case and used the constitutional provision to justify its decision to elevate
domestic law over international law in another).
16. See Chisanga Puta-Chekwe & Nora Flood, From Division to Integration:
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights as Basic Human Rights, in GIVING
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However, the vagueness of social rights language usually provides an
explanation for its undervaluation. 7
B. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO SOCIAL RIGHTS
Historically, social rights in Argentina were not considered
binding. Judges took these rights as "programmatic" in nature. In
other words, they were little more than general policy goals, long-
term promises enshrined in a constitutional text.' 8 Under this
approach, social rights needed specific regulation by Congress to
become effective. This classical distinction between "operative" and
"programmatic" provisions was not explicit in the Constitution. 9
Yet this distinction seems to be losing ground. It seems to be
inconsistent with the notion of a human right. At first sight, a
"programmatic" definition appears to give the government more
leeway in choosing how and when, if ever, to honor social rights.
Some also underscore the differences between social and political
rights, to grant binding force only to the latter. Again, such a
distinction is not explicit in the Argentinean Constitution," though it
still can be found in the relevant literature. According to this view,
social rights imply that the state must act: therefore, they are
MEANING TO ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 39, 43 (Isfahan Merali
& Valerie Oosterveld eds., 2001) (noting that the international community's failure
to analyze and elaborate upon the content of social rights has perpetuated the idea
that these rights are less important than civil or political rights).
17. See Rajesh Swaminathan, Regulating Development: Structural Adjustment
and the Case for National Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights, 37 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 161, 162 (1998) (emphasizing that the vague definition of social
rights causes policymakers to "misperceive and understate" the "social costs of
stupefying magnitude" that result from stabilization and structural adjustment
programs in developing countries).
18. See, e.g., AGUSTiN GORDILLO ET AL., DERECHOS HUMANOS VI-34 (2d ed.
1997) (exemplifying the policy-oriented attitude toward constitutional human
rights found throughout mainstream Argentinean legal literature).
19. Leading Argentinean constitutional law scholars still use this pair of
concepts quite often. See, e.g., 1 GERMAN BIDART CAMPOS, MANUAL DE LA
CONSTITUCI6N REFORMADA 299-300 (1998) (centering the distinction in the
"nature and framing" of the norm, with no other explicit criteria).
20. ARG. CONST. (1994) art. 75, § 22. The distinction appears only with the
mention of both U.N. International Covenants, but the context seems to underscore
the unity and equal standing of all treaties. Id. Moreover, delegates at the 1993
United Nations Human Rights Conference in Vienna stressed the indivisibility of
human rights. See Puta-Chekwe & Flood, supra note 16, at 50.
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"positive" rights. On the other hand, civil and political rights mean
that the state must refrain from acting: hence, they are considered
"negative" rights. Under this scheme, only "negative" rights are
justiciable.
The distinction between state action and inaction does not entirely
help to draw a clear line. 1 Several "negative" rights may also imply
state action.22 In fact, any legally enforced right is a positive right, as
it demands some kind of action by the state. 23 However, even rights
usually considered "negative" require the state to act, and not only to
refrain from interfering 4.2  The right to vote25 means that the state
must organize elections, establish vote-counting systems, and fund
the control of all due formalities of the process, among many other
tasks. The right to a legal defense,26 in turn, sometimes includes the
state duty to provide a lawyer free of charge, and, more generally,
due process implies creating and sustaining a complete judiciary
system.
Social rights and civil rights always imply state duties, though in
diverse degrees.27 These rights do not differ in essence. On the
contrary, all of them compose a continuum. Both "positive" and
"negative" rights always impose certain positive and negative
21. For an insightful critique of the distinction between positive and negative
rights, see STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY
LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES 35-48 (1999) (discussing the inadequacy of the
distinction between positive and negative rights and its basis in theoretical and
empirical confusion).
22. See id. at 44 (arguing that rights are not simply "immunities from public
interference" because a disabled state cannot protect negative rights, such as the
ight against being tortured by police officers and prison guards).
23. See id. at 43 (explaining that individuals have rights "only if the wrongs
they suffer are fairly and predictably redressed by their government").
24. See id. at 44 (stressing that negative rights imply both the state's
affirmative grant of right and a legitimate request for assistance addressed to an
agent of the state).
25. See ARG. CONST. (1994) art. 37 (stating that "suffrage shall be universal,
equal, secret and compulsory").
26. See id. art. 18 (mandating that "the defense by trial of persons and rights
may not be violated").
27. See Victor E. Abramovich, Los Derechos Econ6micos, Sociales y
Culturales en la Denuncia Ante la Comisirn Interamericana de Derechos
Humanos 3, 5 (Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos ed., 1997),
available at
http://www.iidh.ed.cr/documentos/herrped/PedagogicasEspecializado/02.pdf.
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obligations on the state. 28 The state has the positive duty to give
citizens the means to exercise a right, and it also has the negative
duty to not interfere in the exercise of it.
29
Sometimes, social rights are confused with social policies ° or
statutes, because the distinction is considered irrelevant. Some
scholars see no difference between a social right written in the
Constitution, or left to public policy.3'
C. SOCIAL RIGHTS AS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Constitutional social rights are different. Under the 1994
Constitution, social rights in Argentina enjoy a supremacy status
over any other legal act in the country.32 This has important
consequences.
On the one hand, these rights seem to impose limits on the
economic policy choices for the Government, including its ability to
commit to certain economic reforms. On the other hand, social rights
impose on the state some obligations, usually with deep financial
implications.
28. See CECILE FABRE, SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION:
GOVERNMENT AND THE DECENT LIFE 65-66 (2000) (reiterating that states have
both a positive obligation to provide the people with, and a negative obligation not
to deprive them of, the minimum resources needed to live decently); see also Puta-
Chekwe & Flood, supra note 16, at 48 (observing that the Maastricht Guidelines'
characterization of the ICESCR as "encompassing duties to respect, protect and
fulfill minimum core entitlements emphasizes the fact that ICESCR obligations are
not solely positive obligations").
29. See MATTHEW C. R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS
DEVELOPMENT 28-29 (1995) (noting that the right to housing encompasses the
right to be free from arbitrary eviction).
30. See HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 198-199 (identifying "welfare
rights" with a "sensibly designed welfare program," and therefore confusing social
rights with social policies).
31. See id. at 209 (arguing that whether social rights are written into the
constitution or left to public policy does not make a difference for the "perceived
value of the modem exchange of property rights for welfare entitlements").
32. ARG. CONST. (1994) art. 31. This clause is similar to the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution, though the 1994 reform made clear that human
rights treaties enjoy the same status as the Constitution itself. Compare U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, with ARG. CONST. (1994) art. 31.
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First, social rights imply that economic policies are not completely
open to the political powers' discretion. Congressional majorities,
plebiscites or exceptional situations would not allow the government
to adopt unconstitutional economic policies. This may prevent self-
exploitation policies. In other words, the Constitution prevents the
people from sacrificing health or education in order to achieve a
certain economic result. Labor law provides an example. In order to
achieve external competitiveness for its products, a country may be
tempted to slash labor costs to the point of risking the health of the
labor force. Constitutional social rights would impede an irrational
"race to the bottom" of regressive labor reform legislation.33
An important limit on discretionary political power comes from
the progression principle included in the ICESCR.34 The principle
can be construed as a restriction on possible reductions on the
protection of a right. For instance, since Argentina grants free
primary education to its residents, it cannot start charging a fee-
even nominal-for the same service.35 The progression principle,
however, leaves some room for exceptions. The U.N. Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("CESCR") permits certain
retrogressive measures if they are fully justified with regard to the
whole set of social rights, and if the state has really used all its
available resources.36
33. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 1, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-249, 39 Stat. 675, c. 432
(enacting United States federal legislation in the early 20' century, banning child
labor which was designed to curb the "race to the bottom" in states facing
competitiveness problems). The objective was, essentially, to prevent self-
exploitation and ensure fair trade among the states. Id. See also Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (holding that the Act of Sept. 1, 1916 "not
only transcends the authority delegated to Congress over commerce but also exerts
a power as to a purely local matter to which the federal authority does not
extend").
34. ICESCR, supra note 12, art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. at 5; see also American
Convention on Human Rights, art. 26 Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 144 [hereinafter ACHR]. Both treaties are included in the Argentinean
Constitution, but Swaminathan's analysis does not include this element.
Swaminathan, supra note 17.
35. Tuition-free education is granted in ARG. CONST. (1994) art. 75, § 19. See
MAC DARROW, BETWEEN LIGHT AND SHADOW: THE WORLD BANK, THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 254
(2003) (observing that a state's membership in international financial institutions
cannot conflict with the state's treaty obligation to provide free education).
36. See CRAVEN, supra note 29, at 131 (acknowledging that the strength of the
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Second, social rights imply certain duties for the state. Although
the extent of these duties remains unclear, the CESCR has developed
certain principles on the duties of States Parties to the ICESCR.37
States are required to take "immediate, deliberate, concrete, and
targeted steps towards the realization of the rights."38 While the states
would be granted some degree of discretion in choosing the
appropriate steps, an essential minimum must always be ensured.39
Adopting relevant legislation, although desirable, is not enough; the
ICESCR emphasizes the need for judicial remedies.4"
Given the inclusion of social rights in the Argentinean
Constitution, social spending may enjoy a privileged status over
other expenses. According to the ICESCR, for instance, the state
should use "the maximum of its available resources."'" The
Argentinean Supreme Court has interpreted these words as a way to
restrict the scope of social rights.42 These rights appear to depend on
the availability of resources.43 Of course, social rights advocates
ICESCR lies in states' commitment to adopt the rights promoted by the treaty
while granting flexibility to states when problems arise).
37. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. &
Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations,
2, 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1990/8 (Dec. 14, 1990) (decreeing that all steps taken by
states should be, as much as possible, clearly aimed at meeting their obligations
under the ICESCR).
38. See CRAVEN, supra note 29, at 151.
39. See id. at 140-41, 151 (emphasizing that in times of economic hardship, the
state first should secure the rights of the most disadvantaged populations).
40. See id. at 151 (opining that judicial review at the national level is necessary
for the implementation of treaty obligations).
41. ICESCR, supra note 12, art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. at 5; accord UDHR, supra
note 13, art. 22 (expanding the means for countries to adopt rights with both
internal efforts of the state and external assistance from international entities);
ACHR, supra note 34, art. 26, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 152 (establishing member states'
obligation to progressively achieve rights in economic, social, educational,
scientific, and cultural spheres provided by the Charter of the Organization of
American States).
42. See Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN][Supreme Court of Justice],
27/12/1996, "Chocobar, Sixto C. c. Caja Nac. De Previsi6n para el Personal del
Estado y Servicios Pfiblicos," La Ley [L.L.] (1997-B-240) (Arg.), § 11, available
at www.garridocordobera.com.ar/chocobar.htm (stressing the progressive principle
enshrined in Article 26 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights which
states that in order to achieve the maximum effectiveness of benefits granted by
the economic, social and cultural rights, states should adopt provisions in a
particular order so as to progressively accomplish them).
43. See FABRE, supra note 28, at 166-67 (noting that these resources not only
2006]
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would object to taking this provision as a discretionary clause, which
would impede any meaningful reading of these rights. The ICESCR
seems to not refer to the resources the state decides to use, but to
every available-existing-resource.
Even in the context of an economic crisis, these rights maintain a
binding status. Some scholars consider state obligations based on
social rights to be "qualified, but not erased," by a situation of deep
economic crisis." In addition, the ICESCR does not include any
provision for derogation of social rights under times of economic
hardship. 5 Moreover, the CESCR has emphasized that states should
ensure the widest possible enjoyment of these rights even in times of
economic crisis.46 Therefore, the state cannot simply declare an
"economic emergency" to forsake these rights. 7
D. SOME RECENT JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
The "justiciability" (i.e., judicial enforceability) of a social right
comes from its binding status. A judicial trend to favor the
recognition of social rights is becoming more definite. In Argentina,
judges can also exercise their constitutional review powers to enforce
social rights.48
Argentina's judicial review clearly resembles the system adopted
by the United States Supreme Court since 1803. 49 Any court, even
include financial resources, but also human, technological, and informational
resources).
44. Barbara von Tigerstrom, Implementing Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, in GIVING MEANING TO ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, supra
note 16, at 139, 155.
45. See CRAVEN, supra note 29, at 22 (observing that the ICESCR does not
make allowance for the derogation of rights during public emergencies).
46. See id. at 151 (emphasizing the ICESCR's stance that, even in times of
resource scarcity, states are obliged to strive for the broadest enjoyment of rights,
particularly for vulnerable members of society).
47. See id. at 22 (describing periods of economic hardship that could qualify as
a "public emergency", but indicating that even those would not call for derogation
of rights).
48. ARG. CONST. (1994) art. 14 bis (providing for constitutionally guaranteed
social rights). With a few exceptions, the judiciary has authority to hear and decide
all cases arising under the Constitution. See id. art. 116.
49. See Jonathan Miller, Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability: A
Sociology of the U.S. Model and Its Collapse in Argentina, 21 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 77, 99-100 (1997) (discussing the difficulties facing a judicial
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the lowest, can assess any law or any administrative act in force with
regard to its consistency with the Constitution. This broad judicial
power is exercised also by the Supreme Court as the final interpreter
of Argentina's Constitution. Though formally non-binding,50 the
court's decisions have a definitive impact on constitutional issues,5
and are only limited by certain rulings issued by the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights.
In addition, constitutional review may be exercised through a
quick injunctive relief, the amparo action, applicable even to cases
involving groups or classes of citizens for claims regarding rights of
general public interest, the right to a healthy environment, or
consumers' rights. 2 The action in these cases may be brought even
by nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") or the Ombudsman.53
Some recent decisions by the Argentinean Supreme Court have
enforced social rights. In particular, the court has focused on state
duties derived from the right to health care. In 2000, the Supreme
Court confirmed in Asociaci6n Benghalensis a lower court's decision
that ordered the national government to grant timely and appropriate
medical treatment, including the allocation of required drugs, to all
patients affected by HIV/AIDS. 4 The court enforced the state duty as
described in a national law and as framed in the right to health care,
now included in the Constitution.5 This put a limit on the political
discretion of the executive.
system charged with providing checks and balances on the executive and
legislative branches, a hallmark of the U.S system of government).
50. There is no formal stare decisis rule, since Argentina belongs to the Civil
Law tradition.
51. See Laura Saldivia, The Constitutional Protection of Sexual Minorities in
Argentina, 9 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 331, 334 (2002) (noting that although
Argentina's Civil Law tradition does not recognize the principle of stare decisis,
lower courts nonetheless defer to the Supreme Court's decisions).
52. ARG. CONST. (1994) art. 43 (providing for the expedited review of
constitutional claims).
53. Id. (providing that "[a]ny person shall file a prompt and summary
proceeding regarding constitutional guarantees").
54. See CSJN, 1/6/2000, "Asociaci6n Benghalensis y otros c/ Ministerio de
Salud y Acci6n Social - Estado Nacional s/ amparo ley 16.986," L.L. (2000-A-
986, 13) (Arg.) (Molin& O'Connor, and Boggiano, J., concurring); see also
VICTOR ABRAMOVICH & CHRISTIAN COURTIS, Los DERECHOS SOCIALES COMO
DERECHOs EXIGIBLES 139-41 (2002).
55. Asociaci6n Benghalensis, L.L. at 6, 13.; ARG. CONST. (1994) art. 42.
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The decision came out as a somewhat surprising event. First, the
court had been usually fairly conservative in moral issues,56 and
many felt that it was not likely to have sympathy for those
affected/stigmatized by AIDS. Second, the decision went against the
government's desire to have leeway in the administration of
resources. Finally, the decision enforced a social right, usually
considered not "real" rights, but just "programmatic" in nature. In the
case of social rights, the court indeed offers a mixed record, as is
explained below.
In addition, the court had always been extremely deferential to the
resource management carried out by the political branches, the
Executive in particular. The most striking concession to the
executive, however, involved private assets. In the 1990 Peralta
decision,57 the Supreme Court upheld an emergency decree that, in
the face of hyperinflation and the risk of financial collapse,
converted most bank accounts in the country into long-term
government bonds.58 Therefore, it was somehow remarkable that a
social right was upheld in Benghalensis.59
Yet the decision can also be explained. First, even a conservative
and politically insulated court needs to gather some degree of
legitimacy and support. The Argentinean Court was by then in one of
the lowest levels of public esteem. This case offered an opportunity
to show concern and care for a vulnerable group in society.6" The
56. In 1991, the court upheld the administrative denial of the right to establish a
gay legal private association called "Comunidad Homosexual Argentina," aimed at
fighting discrimination and to encourage debate of gay issues. The decision
determined that homosexuality was immoral, and therefore opposed to the "public
good." The decision is known as Comunidad Homosexual Argentina, and it is
published in the official register of the Supreme Court, vol. 314, at 1531. See
Saldivia, supra note 51, at 344-54. See also Jonathan Miller, Evaluating the
Argentine Supreme Court under Presidents Alfonsin and Menem (1983-1999), 7
Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 369, at 423.
57. See CSJN, 27/12/1990, "Peralta Luis y otros c/ Estado Nacional," Fallos
(1990-313-1513) (Arg.).
58. CSJN, 22/11/1991, "Comunidad Homosexual Argentina," Fallos (1991-
314-1531) (Arg.). See Miller, supra note 56, at 400-03.
59. See Asociaci6n Benghalensis, L.L. at 6, 15, 21 (analyzing the constitutional
hierarchy of the right to health and its preeminence in Argentinean law and several
international legal instruments).
60. Comunidad Homosexual Argentina, Fallos (1991-314-1531). See Miller,
supra note 56, at 432 (admitting the need for the court to regain public
acceptance).
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decision came at the same time that a general strike protested against
an agreement with the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") that
included the adoption of an austere budget.61 Finally, the court,
packed with appointees from the previous administration, felt no
particular ties to the new President, elected in 1999. Besides, AIDS
treatment itself, unlike condom distribution or sexual education, did
not pose any major challenge to conservative views.
. Second, the applicable legal framework offered sound support for
the decision, and made it not look like an undue intrusion in politics.
In other words, the Supreme Court did not have to define the
obligation, because it was already explicit in the law.62
Third, some justices felt that they could use the case to advance
their own agenda, namely, the "right to life" as a "natural" right, and
they seized this opportunity. Three justices chose to write two
separate opinions. Justices Boggiano and Molin6 O'.Connor, for
instance, emphasized the state's duty to protect public health, as part
of the "right to life," which they defined, quoting language from
previous Supreme Court's rulings, as "the first natural right of the
human person, pre-existent to any positive legislation. 63 In fact, the
court, including Justices Boggiano, Molin6 O'Connor and Vdizquez
(who also supported, in his separate opinion, the outcome in
Benghalensis), used the same language in a 2002 decision banning
the production and sale of an emergency contraception pill.64
The right to health care has been sustained. Soon after
Benghalensis, the court again upheld this right in Campod6nico,65
61. POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD 2000-2002 49 (2002).
62. See ABRAMOVICH & COURTIS, supra note 54, at 251.
63. Asociaci6n Benghalensis, L.L. at § 9 (Boggiano & Molin6 O'Connor, J.J.,
separate opinion).
64. See CSJN, 5/3/2002, "Portal de Belkn - Asociaci6n Civil sin Fines de
Lucro c/ Ministerio de Salud y Acci6n Social de la Nacion s/ amparo," L.L. (2002-
P-709, 12) (Arg.).
65. See CSJN, 24/10/2000, "Campod6nico de Beviaqua, Ana Carina c/
Ministerio de Salud y Acci6n Social - Secretaria de Programas de Salud y Banco
de Drogas Neopldsicas," L.L. (2000-C-823) (Arg.), 3, 7; see also Christian Courtis,
La Aplicaci6n de Tratados e Instrumentos Internacionales Sobre Derechos
Humanos y la Protecci6n jurisdiccional del Derecho a la Salud en la Argentina, in
JUSTICIABILIDAD DE LOS DESC EN AMItRICA LATINA: EXPERIENCIAS COMPARADAS
28, 292, available at http://www.pdhumanos.org/libreria/libro6/13_courtis.pdf.
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confirming the state's positive duties. 66 According to the decision,
the government had to provide an expensive medication to a four-
year-old child, after his union-owned health insurance announced its
financial collapse. The state duty derives, the court ruled, from the
language of international treaties on human rights included in the
Constitution.67 The court used again the "right to life" as an
argument, but this time it did not describe it as the "first natural
right".68 Probably the more numerous majority in Campod6nico did
not share a unified theory of natural rights.
A different approach was followed later. In a March 2002
decision, the court used formal arguments to deny a single-parent
impoverished family the provision of certain social services,
including medical care. 69 This regressive result may be justified by
the explicit imposition, through an act of Congress, of a state of
"economic emergency". This emergency can be seen as a reason for
the court to* be more deferential, though the court did not use this
argument and relied on formal grounds to dismiss the claim. In other
words, unlike the Benghalensis and Campod6nico cases, this new
case involves an explicit expansion of discretionary powers by the
political branches in the context of a legally declared emergency. y
Lower courts have also taken similar steps in the recognition of
social rights. In 1997, a court of appeals ordered a provincial
government to provide drinkable water to an indigenous community,
66. See Campod6nico de Beviaqua, L.L. 3, 7, 8, § 16; see also Courtis, supra
note 65, at 292 (affirming the state's obligation to take actions to satisfy the right
to health care).
67. See id., L.L. § 17 (elaborating that the state's duty is an affirmative duty to
implement the rights guaranteed in the international treaties); see also Courtis,
supra note 65, at 292 (noting that the court's language in Campod6nico was taken
from Articles 23, 24, and 26 of the CRC).
68. Compare Campod6nico de Beviaqua, L.L., § 15 (omitting discussion of the
right to health care as a "natural right"), with Asociaci6n Benghalensis, L.L. para. 9
(voicing the right to health care as the "first natural right").
69. CSJN, 12/3/2002, "Ramos, Marta Roxana y otros c/ Buenos Aires
Provincia de y otros s/ amparo," L.L. (2002-R-1012) (Arg.), 6 (expressing the
extraordinary character of the protection provided by the legal measure amparo
that can only be invoked once previous procedures have been exhausted by the
petitioner).
70. See Rodolfo Ariza Clerici, El Derecho a la Salud en la Corte Suprema de
Justicia de la Naci6n, JURIDICE, undated, para. V-2 (2002),
http://www.juridice.com.ar/doctrina/salud.htm.
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to conduct studies on the health effects of existing water provisions
at the site, and to provide treatment to those members of the
community that required such assistance."' In 1998, a court of
appeals ordered the federal government to fulfill its commitment to
produce a vaccine against an endemic disease, and also designated
the Ombudsman office as the monitoring body for that obligation.72
E. A MIXED RECORD
Yet other social rights received a narrower reading. In Chocobar,73
the court discussed constitutional guarantees for retired workers. The
court acknowledged Congress's broad discretionary powers to
regulate these rights,74 and to adapt these rights to new situations.75
The Supreme Court also adopted a restricted understanding of the
right to a free higher education. In a 1999 decision,76 the court
narrowed the scope of a constitutional provision which commanded
Congress to "guarantee the principles of free and equitable State
public education" in its legislation on the issue.77 The right also
comes from Article 13 of the ICESCR.78 In its majority vote, the
71. Cdmara de Apelaciones en lo Civil de Neuqu6n, Sala II, 19/5/1997,
"Menores Comunidad Paynemil s/ acci6n de amparo" (Comunidad Paynemil),
Expte. No. (311 -CA-1997) (Arg.) (noting that the legal protection was granted in
the case at hand, in order to safeguard the health of the indigenous children's
community infected by water contaminated with mercury and lead); see also
ABRAMOVICH & COURTIS, supra note 54, at 138-39 (highlighting the power of
judicial review to emphasize the vulnerability and urgency caused by the state's
failure to address a community's lack of access to potable water).
72. See Cdmara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo
Federal, Sala IV, 2/6/1998, "Viceconte, Maria Cecilia c/ Estado Nacional -
Ministerio de Salud y Acci6n Social- s/ amparo ley 16.986, (Arg.); see also
ABRAMOVICH & COURTIS, supra note 54, at 146-54 (affirming positive obligation
of states to provide vaccinations as a basic fundamental right).
73. See Chocobar, L.L. at 3.
74. See id. at 2-3, §§ 9, 17; see also Levit, supra note 10, at 326-27 (arguing
that the court's indifference toward the importance of international treaties
incorporated into the Argentinean Constitution undermines the treaties' force of
law in Argentina and impedes the role of judicial review in the country's efforts to
enforce the basic human rights guaranteed by such treaties).
75. See Chocobar, L.L. at 2-3, § 12.
76. See CSJN, 24/5/1999, "Estado Nacional (Ministerio de Cultura y
Educaci6n de la Naci6n) formula observaci6n estatutos U.N.C. -art. 34 ley 24.521 -
"(U.N.C.), L.L. (1999-E-65, 20-21) (Arg.).
77. ARG. CONST. (1994) art. 75, § 19 (emphasis added).
78. ICESCR, supra note 12, art. 13, 999 U.N.T.S. at 1976 (recognizing that
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court understood "free" education as restricted by the word
"equitable,"7 9 allowing some low fees to be imposed to those
students "who may pay" or "who have more resources."8
Yet with regard to the concept of "emergency," the judiciary
seems to apply a more strict scrutiny. In a 2002 decision, the
Supreme Court has established clear limits to the "emergency"
powers of the executive or the legislature. The decision struck down
the restrictions on bank accounts.81 In its reasoning, the court
emphasized that economic emergencies cannot suspend the rule of
law.82
As a bottom line, however, some social rights, especially the right
to health care, can have an impact on policymaking, through judicial
review. This remains true even after the appointment of new justices
with very different backgrounds in 2003 and 2004.
II. CONTRADICTIONS WITH PROGRAMS
SPONSORED BY IFIS
The World Bank and the IMF, among other IFIs, have promoted
policies with a visible impact on human rights,83 and on social rights
in particular, since many proposed spending cuts affect health care
and education.84 In recent years, a widely accepted set of economic
"[h]igher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of
capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive
introduction of free education").
79. U.NC.,L.L.at§§9, 10, 11.
80. Id., L.L. at §§ 12, 13.
81. CSJN, 1/2/2002, "Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires s/ solicita intervenci6n
urgente en autos: "Smith, Carlos Antonio c/ Poder Ejecutivo Nacional o Estado
Nacional s/ sumarisimo" (Smith), L.L. (2002-B-32) (Arg.).
82. Id. at § 9.
83. See DARROW, supra note 35, at 69 (describing the findings of an
independent expert from the U.N. Commission on Human Rights that structural
adjustment programs have adversely affected human rights). The impact may even
lead to lawsuits in Argentina against IFIs; claims filed regarding the World Bank's
activities in Argentina are also mentioned. Id. at 145.
84. See id. at 70 (explaining that spending cuts first harm politically vulnerable
targets, such as health, education and small farming, while the interests of the elite
are protected). In general, most programs designed by the IFIs involve a sharp
reduction of government spending, which usually impacts government provision of
education and health care; Swaminathan, supra note 17, at 174, 181-82 (predicting
that the World Bank and IMF funded policies would be "likely to adversely affect
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measures, labeled as "the Washington Consensus," included fiscal
discipline and trade liberalization, with an emphasis on protecting
property rights, privatization, and market deregulation.85  By
promoting these measures, the institutions sometimes influence
specific budgetary allocations.86
Some privatization programs may affect social rights.87 For
instance, the World Bank has proposed to organize services for the
poor according to "effective demand,"88 and not the right to those
services. A demand-based system might keep the poor in a
disadvantaged situation, by reinforcing a pattern of underutilization
of the services.
Privatizations in Argentina also affected workers' social rights.
For instance, the country unbundled its railway system and
transferred some operational responsibilities to the private sector. As
a consequence, the labor force was reduced by seventy percent, a
measure with far-reaching social impact.89
Access to some crucial social services may also be affected by
privatization. The World Bank has advanced the elimination of
an individual's right to education, and especially, to free primary education"); see
also Margaret Conklin & Daphne Davidson, The IMF and Economic and Social
Rights: A Case Study of Argentina, 1958-1985, 8 HuM. RTS. Q. 227 (1986)
(describing the particular situation for Argentina).
85. See generally Moises Naim, Fads and Fashion in Economic Reforms:
Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion?, (Oct. 26, 1999) (unpublished
working draft of a paper prepared for the IMF Conference on Second Generation
Reforms, Washington, D.C. available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/Naim.HTM)
(describing the core principles that defined the Washington Consensus).
86. See DARROW, supra note 35, at 59-60 (describing the case of Indonesia).
Other examples can be found. In early 2002, the IFIs overtly promoted significant
reforms in Argentinean criminal law. See also Swaminathan, supra note 17, at 169
(discussing the manner in which the IFIs operations have grown in "duration and
ambitiousness of scope").
87. See DARROW, supra note 35, at 277 (highlighting that, from a human rights
perspective, sometimes privatizations may "severely undermin[e] governments'
capacities to honour their obligations under applicable human rights conventions").
88. See WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994:
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT 32 (1994) [hereinafter WORLD BANK 1994]
(observing that administrative decisions on investment and services based on
assumptions about a "needs gap," rather than "effective demand," result in
substandard services for the poor).
89. See id. at 55.
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subsidies and the establishment of "suitable options" for which the
poor "are willing to pay." 90 It remains unclear how the social right to
an adequate standard of living contained in Article 11 of the
ICESCR, could be ensured under this paradigm.91 The Bank seems
not to promote universal access to services, but "fair terms" of
access,92 and emphasizes "self-help" solutions for infrastructure
provision.93
Other contradictions may arise on the right to housing enumerated
in Article 11(1) of the ICESCR.94 The World Bank, for instance,
advances the concession of a "real right to use" instead of full
individual freehold titles for inhabitants of Brazilian favelas or
slums.95
Reform programs in education also can pose difficult questions.
The World Bank advanced "cost-sharing and other financial
diversification measures" in public higher education. 96 The Bank
advised Argentina to pass a Higher Education law that contradicted
the constitutional principle of free public education,97 also included
90. See id. at 31 (emphasizing the need to offer the poor "suitable options for
the kinds of services of most value to them (and for which they are willing to
pay)"); see also Sara Grusky, Privatization Tidal Wave: IMF/World Bank Water
Policies and the Price Paid by the Poor, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Sept. 2001, at
14, 15 (explaining that the World Bank's structural adjustment loans usually
require privatization of water, and that "[i]ncreased consumer fees for water can
make safe water unaffordable for poor and vulnerable populations").
91. ICESCR, supra note 12, art. 11, 999 U.N.T.S. at 7 (recognizing universal
rights to an adequate standard of living and to continuous improvement of living
conditions).
92. See WORLD BANK 1994, supra note 88, at 52 (arguing that a hands-off
approach would ensure fairer access to the market for the poor).
93. See id. at 35 (emphasizing the need to "consult" local communities, to
"devolve responsibility for infrastructure provision to local governments, . . . and
to foster self-help"). The self-help scheme arises in the context of the "community
and user model," one of the four main approaches to government regulation of
infrastructure, together with public ownership and operation, public ownership and
private operation, and private ownership and operation. Id. at 36.
94. ICESCR, supra note 12, art. 11(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 7.
95. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING
INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 15-17 (2003) (describing institutions that have
utilized innovations, such as new land-use tactics, to improve trade and the
economy).
96. World Bank, Higher Education Reform Project, Staff Appraisal Report:
Argentina, Rep. No. 13935-A (June 12, 1995).
97. See ARG. CONST. (1994) art. 75, § 19 (empowering Congress to enact laws
[22:101
2006] ARGENTINA: SOCIAL RIGHTS, THORNY COUNTRY 119
in Article 13 of the ICESCR, and the non-retrogression principle
enshrined in the ICESCR.98 In particular, the World Bank could not
advise the imposition of fees in countries with a free public school
system.99
A. REASONS FOR THE CONTRADICTION
The contradiction may increase since the IFIs do not consider
human rights as binding limits in their policy-design process. The
institutions consider human rights concerns as beyond their
specialized, technical mandates. 100
Furthermore, the IFIs seem to underrate social rights even at a
theoretical level. In a 2001 report before the CESCR, the IMF
General Counsel, Mr. Frangois Gianviti, described social rights as
"somewhat removed from the realities of today's internally and
externally, open economy." 101
guaranteeing the principles of free and equitable public education, as well as the
autonomy and autarky of national universities). The higher education law includes
the possibility of imposing student fees in public universities. See Law No. 24.521,
July 20, 1995, B.O. 10/8/95, art. 58.
98. See ICESCR, supra note 12, art. 2, 13, 999 U.N.T.S. at 5, 8 (requiring
States Parties to undertake progressive realization of rights recognized in the
ICESCR, and mandating that "[h]igher education shall be made equally accessible
to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the
progressive introduction of free education").
99. See DARROW, supra note 35, at 254 (observing that the imposition of
school fees as part of structural adjustment programs will often conflict with
Article 13 of the ICESR).
100. See id. at 19, 51, 149 (transcripting the relevant section of the World
Bank's charter); see also Katarina Tomasevski, International Development
Finance Agencies, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK
403, 407 (Asbjorn Eide, Catarina Krause & Allan Rosas eds., 1995) (noting that
the IMF has always inferred from its' mandate a similar restriction against
consideration of "political" issues; even some human rights scholars acknowledge
that the financial nature of the institutions may require less strict human rights
obligations from them).
101. Frangois Gianviti, IMF General Counsel, Economic Social and Cultural
Rights and the International Monetary Fund, 39 in fine, delivered to the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2001/WP.5, 2001 (May 7, 2001).
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III. THE JUDICIARY AND THE CONTRADICTIONS
An interpretive effort must make sense of the competing state
duties, as party to the ICESCR, and as a client of international
financial institutions.10 2 Any major discrepancy between reform
programs and the Constitution may trigger an institutional crisis. The
government may feel the need to agree to certain measures, while
those affected may challenge them through judicial review.
In this context, there is a high chance of judicial review on specific
economic reform proposals. Most cuts in social spending may fall
under judicial scrutiny. The court has upheld workers' rights even in
the context of economic crisis. In a 2002 decision,10 3 the Supreme
Court struck down a 2001 presidential decree 0 4 that cut wages of
public employees by thirteen percent in light of scarcity and
economic turbulences.
Argentina's judiciary, at any level, is entitled to review any
contradiction between social rights and policies sponsored by the
IFIs. On the other hand, this poses questions with regard to the
legitimacy of that judicial intervention.
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND POLITICAL DISCRETION
Some scholars grant that given their non-elected nature, the
judiciary is not the best prepared institution to adopt decisions on
complex social policies,"°5 and thus the judges usually defer to the
political branches. The judicial process is limited in scope and
probing powers, which hinders an adequate assessment of a social
policy.10 6 Some also argue that a judicial enforcement of social rights
102. See DARROW, supra note 35, at 204-05 (pointing out the possibility of a
conciliation between both duties).
103. CSJN, 22/8/2002, "Tobar, Le6nidas c/ E.N. Mro. Defensa Contaduria
General del Ej~rcito- Ley 25.453 s/ amparo -Ley 16.986," L.L. (2002-T-348)
(Arg.) (stressing that the pertinent legislation crossed the reasonable boundaries
imposed by the Constitution to any emergency situation that demanded the
adoption of a specific legal framework to tackle the economic crisis).
104. Decree No. 896/01; see also Law No. 25.453, July 30, 2001.
105. See ABRAMOVICH & COURTIS, supra note 54, at 248-249.
106. See id. at 249.
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would affect the separation of powers. °7 Others point out that the
public debate is affected if "a small legal elite" has the final decision
on social and economic issues. 108
Yet judicial enforcement of social rights can be described simply
as the enforcement of fundamental policy choices included in the
Constitution. The 1994 Constitutional Convention has imposed
limits on the available policy choices, and judges have to enforce
them. 1 9 Social rights do not need a confirmation through the political
process: their inclusion in the Constitution aims precisely to keep
them out of ordinary politics. The same argument usually sustains
the application of civil and political rights. For instance, a judge must
impede or stop torture on a defendant, and no prosecutor or official
would accuse the judge of interfering with policy choices made by
the Ministry of the Interior, or the Police. The judge would be only
enforcing restrictions already set by the Framers.
Social rights, even if enforced by the judiciary, leave plenty of
room for political discretion. " 0 The executive and the legislature may
adopt one among many different alternatives to ensure the
effectiveness of social rights. Following a previous example,
determining the best means to stop tortures at police stations belongs
to the realm of executive or congressional discretion. But the
political branches cannot take torture as an unfortunate accident, or
as a legitimate way to fight crime.
B. REASON, RATIONALITY, AND MINIMUM CORE
Many scholars highlight that the judiciary can play an important
role, if it applies juridical standards, such as "reasonableness,"
107. See ERIKA DE WET, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ENFORCEABILITY OF ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL RIGHTS: THE MEANING OF THE GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL
FOR SOUTH AFRICA 40-42 (1996).
108. See Neuman, supra note 11, at 1893 (noting that vesting the judiciary with
the final power of interpretation obstructs, rather than facilitates, the societal
debate on human rights issues).
109. See ARG. CONST. (1994) art. 31 (establishing constitutional supremacy),
and art. 43 (describing judicial review on constitutionality of laws in the context of
amparo actions). On judicial review of constitutionality, see also Saldivia, supra
note 51, at 333.
110. See FABRE, supra note 28, at 146-47 (noting that the Constitution may
enumerate a right but leave it to the democratic majority to determine in what way
to satisfy that right).
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"adequacy, .... equality," or a minimum core of contents for a right."'
In other words, the judiciary does not have to design a public policy,
but only to confront it with the applicable juridical standards, and, if
necessary, to order the political branches to conform to those
standards.112
There is a risk in adopting "reason" as the decisive concept.
"Reason" may quickly become "rationality." The "reasonableness"
standard may be too weak if it does not include some clear references
to a minimum core that should be taken as a baseline." 3
On the other hand, defenders of this principle emphasize the
importance of justification. The court can ask the government to
"explain" how its choices would help to realize a social right.' 4
Some make the lexical leap and say this is a review for "sincerity and
rationality.""' 5 Yet "rationality" may imply something different from
"reasonableness." The reduction of reason to rationality is one of the
most criticized legacies of hard-line positivism." 6 In this reduced
view, "reason" relates to an instrumental justification: some action is
rational/reasonable if it achieves a desired result. A broad concept of
"reasonableness," on the other hand, may include different elements:
an action is reasonable if it is in accordance with moral norms, with
the cultural world,"7 even if it is not "rational." However, the
emphasis on justification by itself may lead to a series of "justified"
violations of social rights, if there is no clear baseline, like the one
provided by a minimum core." 8
111. See ABRAMOVICH & COURTIS, supra note 54, at 250.
112. See id. at 250, 252.
113. See David Bilchitz, Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum
Core: Laying the Foundations for Future Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence,
19 SAJHR 1, 10 (2003) (arguing that using a benchmark, rather than an amorphous
standard, would clarify the state's obligations imposed by socio-economic rights).
114. See Etienne Mureinik, Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in
the Constitution, 8 SAJHR 464, 471 (1992) (reasoning that a court's questioning of
government decisions improves the quality of government).
115. Seeid.at474.
116. See generally Jirgen Habermas, Remarks on the Concept of
Communicative Action, in SOCIAL ACTION 151, 175-78 (Gottfried Seebass &
Raimo Tuomela, eds., Ruth Stanley, trans., 1985) (discussing the reduced concept
of reason in relation to rationality).
117. Seeid. at 176-77.
118. For instance, any government may argue that if general welfare is the
objective, social spending cuts may be justified if they "reasonably" or "rationally"
[22:101
ARGENTINA: SOCIAL RIGHTS, THORNY COUNTRY
Yet the concept of "minimum core" also entails some risks. Under
this approach, governments may adopt merely symbolic benchmarks,
with little or no impact in daily life of real citizens. A similar
problem has affected the "minimum wage" granted in Article 14 bis
of the Argentinean Constitution: usually the figure was considered
nothing more than a formalism, with no relevance for the labor
market."9
Judges may combine and improve the concepts of
"reasonableness" and "minimum core," in light of their institutional
mission, namely, to protect the citizens' rights. First,
"reasonableness" should not be reduced to "rationality."
Additionally, judges should analyze the resources really available,
going beyond existing budget allocations, and requiring the state to
demonstrate the impossibility of reaching the "minimum core."110
Finally, the concept of "minimum core" itself should be replaced by
the idea of an "adequate core" or a "proportional core,"2 ' in light of
the prevailing social and economic conditions of the country as a
whole. Judges, in sum, should base their reasoning in the concept of
life, not mere survival.
In some other instances, the judiciary only transforms a state
policy into a legal obligation.'22 In other words, the court declares
that what the state did was not a policy choice, but rather a duty
under a constitutional provision, a statute, or even an international
law treaty or covenant. This is, to a great extent, the solution adopted
in Benghalensis.
lead to that objective. In other words, social rights violations may be rationalized
as a necessary step for the full enjoyment of these rights.
119. ARG. CONST. (1994) art. 14 bis (granting workers "minimum vital and
adjustable wage").
120. See Bilchitz, supra note 113, at 23 (finding that this form of jurisprudence
recognizes the importance of socio-economic rights).
121. See generally Andrfs Rossetti, The Right to Equal Redistribution of
Wealth: An Argumentation to Find the Tools for Its Implementation Under the
Individual Complaints 1, 9 (Feb. 2000) (unpublished thesis available at
http://www.jur.lu.se/Intemet/english/essay/Masterth.nsf/0/166A02D56E8E2A 1OC
1256CF4003B36ED/$File/xsmall.pdf) (discussing the idea of "proportion" in
human rights and its superiority to the idea of providing minimum human rights).
122. See ABRAMOVICH & COURTIS, supra note 54, at 250.
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In a third type of interventions, the courts must devise a measure
to ensure the enjoyment of a social right, 23 because of the urgency of
the situation, or because of a complete lack of assistance and
cooperation from the political branches. In any of these situations,
the judiciary should also design some form of control over the
adequate compliance of its orders, or the proper enjoyment of the
right at stake, especially for long periods. 24
C. EQUALITY AND SCARCITY
Even in the case of an absolute lack of resources, there is a
constitutional answer. This general scarcity must be considered a
public burden, a hardship to be shouldered by all citizens, according
to the principle of equality before the law.'25 In other words: every
inhabitant must bear an equitable and reasonable share of this brunt,
according to the principles set in the Constitution. 2 6 The same has
always applied to other emergencies, social or natural, such as war,
famine or epidemics. The public nature of this burden comes from
the principle of solidarity, a tie among all members of a political
community.
The principle of equality before the law refers, in this context, to a
law that includes explicit social rights, as phrased in the Constitution.
Equality before the law implies now either an equitable enjoyment of
social rights, or an evenhanded distribution of their deprivation.
Therefore, the judiciary, even in times of economic crisis, should
adopt equality and social rights as guidelines. Retrogressive
measures constitute an undesirable alternative. The lack of respect
for social rights can endanger other human rights. 27 Once some
human rights become subordinate, governments and scholars feel
entitled to dismiss all of them for the sake of economic growth. 28
123. See ABRAMOVICH & COURTIS, supra note 54, at 252.
124. See id. at 253-54.
125. See ARG. CONST. (1994) art. 16 (providing that "Equality is the basis of
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D. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND IFIs
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